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PERSUASIVE EFFECTS OF STORY
AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
E. James Baesler
Facts and opinions, when offered in
support of a communicator's claim, constitute the domain of factual evidence {Reinard,
1988), which can be subdivided into report
evidence, 1 such as a story narrative, and
statistical evidence, defined as numerical
representations of events.
Cognitive response theory {see Petty,
Ostrom, & Brock, 1981 for a review) would
suggest that if an agent attempted to support
a persuasive claim with evidence, then a
target would generate cognitive responses
(CRs) to the message. Petty and Cacioppo
(1986) found that high quality message
arguments produce more favorable and
fewer unfavorable cognitive responses
{UCRs) than low quality arguments. These
favorable cognitive responses (FCRs), in
turn, are positively correlated with persuasive outcomes.
Petty and Cacioppo do not address the
characteristics of the message arguments that
may be related to CRs or persuasive outcomes. Thus, two evidence issues that might
increase our understanding of persuasion
remain unaccounted for by current CR
models: {a) What characteristics distinguish
1 The story narrative is one common operationaliza~on of "repo~ evidence." Ot_her researchers operationalize ~eport evidence as case history, exemplar, or opinion
(Remard, 1988).
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story from statistical evidence? and (b)
Which of these discriminating characteristics
are positively correlated with persuasive
outcomes?

INvoLVEMENT, CREDmIUTY,
AND VIVIDNESS

Persuasive effects of evidence are moderated by at least three variables not subsumed
by any one persuasion theory, but nonetheless that need to be accounted for when
attempting to explain effects of evidence.
First, higher degrees of topic involvement
facilitate the persuasive effects of evidence
when compared to low topic involvement
apparently because of systematic processing
of central message cues (Stiff, 1986). Second,
communicator credibility interacts with involvement, such that as involvement increases, the
effect of credibility on persuasion increases
to some point beyond which further increases in involvement decrease persuasiveness {Stiff, 1986). Third, several studies have
shown support for the persuasive advantage
of vivid when compared to nonvivid evidence
types of evidence {e.g., Kazoleas, 1993;
Baesler & Burgoon, 1994); other research has
not revealed support for the vividness hypothesis {e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; see review
by Taylor & Thompson, 1982). This study
attempted to control these potentially confounding variables by creating messages that
are comparable on topic involvement, communicator credibility, and message vividness.
CHARACTERISTICS OF STORY
AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE

In a social influence context, given sufficient target motivation {such as an involving
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message topic), story evidence may be easier
to argue against than statistical evidence. A
persuader's use of a story narrative could be
refuted by the target's recall of a single
contradictory story. This is not the case for
arguing against statistical evidence. Typically, only experts in particular knowledge
domains would routinely have access to
statistical data in memory, whereas most
individuals have a storehouse of stories on
many topics. Thus, it would be difficult for
most adults to marshal statistical data to
counterargue a claim, but story data, since
they are based on one's personal experience
or the experience of others that is readily
accessible, would be the preferred mode of
arguing against both story and statistical
claims.
Other features of evidence that distinguish
story from statistical evidence, and might
also be related to persuasiveness, include
readability, complexity, personalness, and
scientificness. 2 Since the numerical representation of statistics is encountered less frequently in everyday life than in stories, and
since statistics are more difficult to interpret
than a story, statistics are expected to be less
readable and more complex than stories.
Personalness and scientificness of evidence were included in this study since they
are characteristics unique to a particular type
of evidence. The content and structure of the
story, with characters engaged in a dialogue,
are inherently more personal than statistics;
statistics, by including numerical data based
on some type of research, are often perceived as inherently more scientific than
stories.
Given the review of evidence characteristics and persuasion, the following hypotheses
and research questions were posed:
H 1: Story and statistical types of evidence should be persuasive in: (a) changing

beliefs in the direction advocated in a message
and (b) producing a greater number of
favorable than unfavorable cognitive responses.
H2: Statistical evidence, when compared to story evidence, generates: (a)
greater belief change in the direction advocated by the message and (b) fewer unfavorable cognitive responses.
RQ1: Are there differences in perceptions of the readability, complexity, personalness, and scientificness of story and statistical
evidence?
RQ2: Given differences in evidence characteristics, do any of these differences covary
with persuasion as indicated by belief change
or cognitive responses?

2 It was impractical to manipulate all of these
variables for both story and statistical types of evidence;
instead, these exploratory variables were measured
rather than directly manipulated.

3 Other scholars, such as Jackson (1992), might
describe this design as message-by-treatments with
multiple responses (evidence crossed with message
replications, and persons nested under evidence but

METHOD

Subjects and Procedures
Participants (N= 100) were undergraduate
students who participated in the study for
extra credit. There were no significant
differences in age (M=22.93) or sex (56%
female) across experimental conditions. The
cover story for the investigation asked
participants to evaluate three different articles
for possible publication in the campus
newspaper. Each participant completed the
following sequence of activities for three
story or three statistical messages: pre-test of
beliefs, read article, list CRs, post-test beliefs,
rate the exploratory variables, and complete
manipulation checks.

Design and Independent Variables
A 2 (evidence) X 3 (message topic) mixed
design was employed to test the hypotheses
and answer the research questions. Evidence
was the fixed factor, and message topic was
the random (or within subjects) factor in the
design. 3 Evidence was operationalized as
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story or statistical, and message topics included crime, internships, and birth-control.
Three variations in the order of messages
were created, and no significant differences
in persuasion attributable to order were
found.
Evidence and Message Topics. Story and
statistical evidence were developed on the
basis of Jackson's (1993) recommendation
for message instantiation rather than attempting to manipulate all possible message
variables that might be related to persuasion.
Stories were based on the opinion of a single
individual and contained a scene, characters,
plot, and resolution. Statistics were based on
large samples and were presented as percentages and simple odds (e.g., 80%, 4 out of 10).
Prior research comparing story and statistical evidence has involved only one message
topic and topics of low involvement (Baesler
& Burgoon, 1994; Kazoleas, 1993). Thus,
three message topics were employed to
increase the generalizability of potential
results. The results indicated that all topics
were perceived to be moderately high in
involvement (scores on a 1-9 single item
involvement scale ranged from 7.16-7.62),
with no significant differences between evidence conditions within a given topic.

Dependent Measures
Beliefs and Message Persuasiveness. A mean
score for two items representing pre- and
post-beliefs measured agreement with the
main message argument on 1-9 point Likerttype scales and had a Cronbach inter-item
alpha reliability coefficient of .69.
Cognitive Responses. Two pairs of trained
coders classified the polarity of CRs into
favorable, unfavorable, or neutral/irrelevant
categories (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Scott's
phi inter-coder reliability coefficients were
.86 and .89 for each pair of coders. Ratings of
crossed with replications). I have opted for the more
traditional design language used by Keppel (1982).

SPRING 1997

CRs from both pairs of coders were summed
for subsequent analysis.
Exploratory Variables. Single item 1-9 point
bipolar semantic differential-type scales were
created to measure the following exploratory
variables: complexity (simple/complex),
readability (easy/difficult to read), personalness (personal/impersonal), and scientificness (scientific/unscientific).

Manipulation Checks for Credibility and
Vividness
Credibility. The competence and trustworthiness of the source of the messages (authorship of articles was attributed to graduate
students majoring in journalism) were assessed to confirm that the messages were
"credible" on two 9-point bipolar semantic
differential scales and had a Cronbach
inter-item alpha of .72. Average credibility
scores did not differ for story and statistical
evidence conditions within each of the three
messages.
Vividness. All messages were created to be
moderately vivid by manipulating the linguistic quality of the message. Four 9-point
bipolar items colorful, concrete, interesting,
and stimulating' captured degree of vividness and had an inter-item Cronbach alpha
reliability coefficient of .77. Average vividness scores did not differ between evidence
conditions within each of the three messages.
Overall means for vividness ranged between
5.87 and 6.51, which indicated that all
messages were perceived to be moderately
vivid.
RESULTS

Independent Persuasive Effects ofEvidence
Hypothesis 1 predicted that both types of
evidence would be persuasive and was tested
4 There is a substantial body of literature on vividness
that supports this particular operationalization (see
Baesler's review, 1991).
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TABLE 1

TABLE 2

MEANS FOR BELIEFS-EVIDENCE BY MESSAGE TOPIC

MEANS COGNITIVE REsPONSES-EVIDENCE BY
MESSAGE TOPIC

Evidence Type
Message
Topic
Crime

Story
Pre

Post

Pre

Post

4.61a
(1.41)

6.99ac
(1.01)
6.73
(2.03)
2.58de
(1.45)

4.58b
(1.09)
6.26
(2.21)
3.76
(2.34)

7.44bc
(1.01)

Internship

6.56

Birth control

(2.08)
3.74d
(2.49)

Evidence Type

Statistical

6.35

(2.38)
4.05e
(2.44)

Note: Higher numbers indicate greater agreement with
the position advocated in the message. Within a row,
common letter subscripts indicate that the respective
means were significantly different, p < .02, and numbers
in parentheses are standard deviations.

Story
Message
Topic

Favor- Unfavor- Favor- Unfavorable
able
able
able

7.30
(5.45)
6.80
Internship
(4.67)
Birth control 4.05
(4.20)

Crime

Statistical

2.61
(3.65)
3.00
(3.64)
6.48
(5.24)

8.73
(4.21)
7.34
(5.28)
3.67
(4.10)

3.22
(5.00)
2.93
(3.81)
6.97
(4.69)

Note: For each type of evidence, all paired contrasts
between favorable vs unfavorable cognitive responses
within each topic were statistically significant (p < .02)
except for story evidence/birth control topic. Numbers
in parentheses represent standard deviations.

in relation to belief change and the ratio of
favorable to unfavorable CRs.
three message topics, is the main effect for
Belief Cluznge. Both story and statistical
evidence. This analysis necessitated the hand
evidence were persuasive in cluznging beliefs in
computation of a quasi-F ratio (F') (See
the direction advocated by the crime topic (a
Jackson, 1992, p. 76 for the formula) since
modified alpha level of .02 was used to
the proper error term and degrees of
account for family wise error rates, Keppel,
freedom for testing the main effect of
1982), (50)=9.77, (48)= 13.30, p<..02 (See
evidence (see Keppel, 1982, pp. 530-531)
Table 1 for means), but not for the internship
are not provided in standard repeated
and birth control topics, p> .02.
measures analysis. The F' value was 1.32,
Cognitive Responses. Both types of evidence
and comparison with the critical F'l,2 =
produced more favorable tluzn unfavorable CRs
18.5 (the df for F' are hand calculated based
for the crime, (50)=4.41, (48)=5.22, and
on mean square ratios, which enables one to
internship topics, (50)=3.75, (48)=4.04,
use a standard Ftable, see Keppel, 1982, p.
p<..02, but not for the birth-control topic,
533 for transformation formulae) showed this
p>.02 (See Table 2 for means).
to be nonsignificant.
In addition, a 2 (evidence) X 3 (message
Comparative Persuasive Effects ofEvidence
topic) analysis of variance on post beliefs was
To compare the persuasiveness of story conducted to determine if the persuasiveness
versus statistical evidence (H2), two 2 (evi- of evidence varied by topic. This yielded a
dence) X 3 (message topic) repeated mea- significant two-way interaction between evisures analyses of variance were conducted, dence and message topic, F(2,196)=4.14,
with post beliefs and UCRs as dependent p<..05, w 2 =.01. Overall, neither type of
measures. Separate ANOVAs rather than a evidence demonstrated persuasive superiorsingle MANOVA were employed since the ity across all three messages.
underlying metric for the dependent variUnfavorable Cognitive Responses. Hypothesis
ables was different.
2 predicted that statistical evidence would be
Post Beliefs. The most direct test of H2, more difficult to counterargue (and thus
which focused on whether a particular type should generate fewer UCRs) than story
of evidence is more persuasive across all evidence; however, the results indicated that
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TABLE 3
MEANS PERSONAL AND SCIENTIFlC CHARACTERISTICS
OF EVIDENCE-EVIDENCE BY MESSAGE TOPIC

ness were not reliably related to the persuasive outcome measures (rs ranged between
-.04 and .10,p>.05).

Characteristics of Evidence
Message
Topic
Crime
Internship
Birth control

Personal

Scientific

Story

Statistic

Story

Statistic

7.13
(2.19)
6.96
(1.95)
7.62
(1.38)

5.06
(2.45)
5.36
(2.27)
5.67
(2.35)

3.41
(2.33)
3.45
(2.04)
5.25
(2.58)

4.89
(2.07)
5.26

(2.00)
5.87
(2.27)

Note: Higher numbers indicate greater amounts of the
evidence characteristic. Numbers in parentheses are
standard deviations. All paired contrasts of evidence
within each topic were statistically significant except
scientificness of evidence for the birth control topic.

there were no differences in the number of
UCRs generated by either type of evidence.
Exploratory Variables. Research question 1
focused on whether several variables might
differentiate story from statistical evidence.
These analyses required the calculation of a
quasi-F ratio according to the same procedures outlined under results for post-beliefs.
The personalness of stories was rated high in
comparison to the moderate ratings of
personalness for statistics for all three message topics, F'=22.37, p<..05, w 2 =.15, critical F(I,28)=4.20 {See Table 3 for means). In
contrast, the sdentificness of statistics was rated
moderate in comparison to lower ratings of
scientificness for story evidence across all
three message topics, F'=6.29, p<..05,
w 2 =.06, critical F(I,6)=5.99 (Refer to Table
3 for means). No patterns of statistical
significance emerged in the evidence contrasts within each message topic for readability and complexity.
Research question 2 asked whether the
exploratory variables that reliably distinguish story from statistical types of evidence
would also predict persuasive effects related
to beliefs or CRs. For each of the three
message topics,._ Pearson product moment
correlations indicated that the evidence
characteristics of scientificness and personal-

DISCUSSION

Story and statistical evidence were persuasive in: (1) changing beliefs (pre to post test)
related to the crime topic, and (2) generating
more favorable than unfavorable CRs for the
crime and internship topics {HI). Statistical
evidence was no more persuasive than story
evidence when measures of beliefs and
UCRs were employed as outcome measures
(H2). Statistical evidence was rated as more
scientific and less personal than story evidence (RQI); however, neither of these
variables covaried with persuasion (RQ2).
In comparison to prior research, which
has shown a persuasive advantage for statistical over story evidence when employing a
low involvement topic (Baesler & Burgoon,
1994), the test of the main effect for evidence
in this study suggested that statistical evidence is neither more nor less persuasive
than story evidence for topics of moderately
high involvement. This finding, when coupled
with the results that indicated both types of
evidence generated comparable levels of
UCRs, does not lend support to the counterargument hypothesis. It appears that simple
statistics (percentages and odds) are no more
difficult to counterargue than story narratives. It remains for future research to
determine whether there are any differences
in the quality of arguments used to discount
statistical versus story evidence in contexts
suited to interactive communication, such as
interpersonal compliance-gaining.
The significant two-way interaction between evidence and message topic indicated
that persuasive effects of evidence varied by
topic. This finding could be interpreted in a
number of ways. The process of ruling out
some interpretations in favor of others is akin
to Popper's (1961) notion that theoretical
explanations are like a fishing net whose

175
PERSUASIVE EFFECTS OF EVIDENCE

SPRING 1997

mesh we endeavor to make finer and finer. investigation might explore statistical feaFor the net used to catch the message- tures of evidence, such as sample size,
evidence interaction some interpretations numerical presentation (e.g., confidence interare more plausible than others given the val, percent, odds), and sampling method,
control and exploratory variables (the mesh under conditions of high and low involveof the net) built into the design of the study. ment. Second, the story features of evidence,
That is, the message-evidence interaction is could be experimentally varied and tested
not attributable to the variables of credibility, for their persuasive effects using an instruinvolvement, vividness, scientificness, person- ment that assesses story coherence and
alness, readability, or complexity.
fidelity (Baesler, 1995) on the basis of Fisher's
Since message topic was a random factor (1989) narrative theory.
in the design, there are a multitude of other
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